Mark Drummond outlines the principles behind one-vote-one-value : > A one-vote-one-value electoral system is one designed to achieve > DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (an important foundation principle) in which the > number of elected representatives is proportional to the number of votes > for a particular candidate/party. So for our house of reps to be > one-vote-one-value it would be necessary that if 5% of people voted > Greens, then 5% of seats (hence around 8 seats of our 148) would be held > by Greens. > And for our senate to be one-vote-one-value it would be necessary that > "regions" (such as our present states and territories) send senators to > the Senate in proportion to their populations. A one-vote-one-value > system would largely or wholly eliminate gerrymanders such as that which > has NSW with far fewer senators per capita than the other states (and > Tasmania in particular). > We could remove the states in their present form but retain two houses > of national parliament (useful as an additional "check and balance"); > one-vote-one-value would still be an issue here. > Proportional representation (with fixed terms to address stability > problems) provides the standard way of achieving one-vote-one-value. PR > uses muti-member electorates rather than single member electorates. So > our Senate uses a form of PR within each state. Critics of proportional > representation (PR) claim it produces unstable parliaments/assemblies, > but fixed terms can largely or wholly address this problem. The idea is > that under PR multiple parties and coalitions are encouraged/compelled > to cooperate to hammer out agreements in an inherently consensual > manner. And the evidence in Europe is clearly that it DOES work very > well indeed. > Another criticism of PR relates to political accountability, in that none > of the individual members could be considered as fully accountable to > the electorate. All such members would be jointly and severally > liable/accountable but certainly such accountability can be diluted > across a larger number. Hence, electorates with more members more > closely approach the one-vote-one-value ideal, but too many dilutes > accountability. Electorate sizes of around seven are considered good on > grounds of political accountability. Electorates with even say 12 > members like our present states for the Senate can be viewed as > spreading accountability across too many politicians. > The major parties prefer smaller electorates to maintain their advantage > over the smaller parties, but electorates seldom have fewer than 5 > members. > Those rejecting regional governments might at least be attracted to the > idea of regional electorates in the national parliament. We could, for > instance, use the whole country as a single electorate for a national > upper house of say 50 or so representatives - technology could address > the unwieldiness of such a system. And we could have say 30 regional > electorates each returning between say 3 and 7 members (depending on > population) for the house of representatives. It would be good if these > 30 regional electorates at least largely coincided with national > government administrative regions for healthcare, education, policing, > water catchments etc. but higher order priorities (such as life and > death ones in the case of health care) might mean administrative regions > will differ from one area of responsibility (eg healthcare) to another > (eg water catchments). Max feels the "check and balance" of the Senate can be rendered unnecessary through the recall of members : > I believe if we were to do away with forced voting and have a very > simple system of government, and people have the ability to recall there > elected member and get a new one at any time , then we don't need the > supposed check and balance that is in the present system. With a system > were when you vote you only get one chance to get it right and you can > not have a bob each way as at present [senate vs. reps vote], then the > 'check and balance' you have is in that you can sack the present > member and put one in place who will do what the electors want. David, in reply to Mark, > > Sovereignty starts with individual human rights and standing as equals > in society. It then extends to varying degrees through various levels > of democratic/political organisation. I'm sure we all agree that human rights are necessary, which implies some sovereignty at the individual level. And that babies, etc., can't be expected to make decisions for themselves, so parents will hold some of their sovereignty. But it's not clear to me that it's necessary to have sovereignty at any level above that and below the national. > with a one-vote-one-value electoral system What does this mean? No excess senators for Tasmania? I agree, but senate reform is a little separate and I fear trying to link them. It would set us up for even more bitter opposition from Tasmania, etc., than we are likely to face now. > absent of the states/territories in their present form Isn't this definition by exclusion? "We don't say what we want, but we don't like what we have?" I wrote : > It's odd we seem to have opposite views on the two issues. You want to > exclude sub-national sovereignty and include one-vote-one-value, I want > the reverse. >> To support "one-vote-one-value" is merely to accept that "all people are >> created equal" at least in so far as their entitlement to vote is >> concerned. > Can we sell that to Tasmanian senators or are we just writing off their > support anyway? Well, if there's a formula determining the money fed to a given region, isolation could count for a component. Isolation due to a water barrier could mean Tasmania is not out in the cold in the new system, at least financially. But .. politically, it would have less influence. The Tasmanian senators would lose their unfair influence. We're only writing them off to the extent that they embrace their unfair influence. >> Those opposed to one-vote-one-value are generally those opposed to >> justice and democracy - the more publicity they get the better - they >> will help our side! > Alas, few operate under the banner of the Injustice and Slavery Party. They > usually call themselves something else. I guess your point is that people don't _directly_ oppose one-vote-one-value, they promote state rights, the rights of Tasmania in particular, and other issues too, I guess. But they don't oppose one-vote -one-value. > My feeling is that the issues are separable and therefore should be > separated. What happens to the Senate should be addressed, but not necessarily in terms of one-vote-one-value. Genuine democratic representation and review, appropriate checks and balances in replacement, would be an alternate path. Still, I'm talking about "options for replacing government system x", not "principle y is really important". David (unindented), replying to John > on the Senate vs OVOV > "One vote one value" does sound too abstract, too much like a maxim to me. > Rather, we should promote the idea that the Senate is divided along party > lines and does not operate as a house of state advocacy, while the > replacement system would provide genuine representation and review (as > compared to "one vote one value"). This is almost exactly the opposite of what I want to say. If the senate really acted as house of state advocacy it would be far less democratic than it is, because some states really would be getting more representation than others. The fact that people vote for the senate without strong regard for state issues (can someone more knowledgeable confirm or debunk that statement?) is simultaneously (a) a democratising effect and (b) evidence against state relevance. My interpretation of Mark's idea is that (a) anti-one-vote-one-value people are anti-democratic and, well, basically evil; (b) other more reasonable people are aware of this; and (c) therefore they will support us for opposing the evil people. My feeling is that the argument falls down around (b). These groups will call themselves "states rights", or "a fair go for Tasmania", or "recognition of diversity within Australia" or "keep the protection that the fathers of Federation envisaged" or something equally plausible. It's not clear we will get any benefit from opposing them amongst the general population, but we will definitely wear their opposition. And losing Tasmania is losing one state of six in a referendum. I asked Mark if he was writing off any hope for support from Tasmania, and it wasn't rhetorical. Maybe we should. If we go for senate reform as well, then I think we are. If we do go for senate reform, we ought to argue for the change to happen a sufficient time in the future, or to come in gradually, so that the current crop of senators doesn't become our bitter enemy. A grandfather clause. Pat Cagel wrote: > The biggest problem caused by the current > delineations of electorates is that it is based on number of > voters. While well intentioned, I think it needs to be a little more > sophisticated than this, and take into account land area. > If the current equal numbers per electorate/region prevails, we are > going to just be replacing one unbalanced "Golden Triangle" system with > a new one. > Commonsense must prevail if we are considering a reorganisation, and > provide electorates that encompass meaningful areas from a management > point of view. > One possibility is that there is a sensible land division, however it > may have more elected members to reflect the population of the area. > However, in votes on vital things like expenditure, some sort of > mechanism should be set up to ensure that more popular areas do not > drive/dictate the outcomes, i.e. one region, one vote. Maybe the > larger regions average their vote to decide their one vote!! Charles : > The primary purpose of delineating electorates is to ensure some > equality of voting power (ie, one man - one vote). > If we are to suggest that land area or some other criteria be used as > well as population, we have to show how and why that is a better idea. > Contrary to your assertion that the 'golden triangle' has too much say, > those IN the 'golden triangle ' argue that States like Tasmania, SA and > WA have too much say. (Because they have 12 Senators each, the same as > NSW , Vic and Qld). > A suggested compromise is have a small number of voters in each > electorate in a rural area (to elect their regional parliament) and > greater number of voters in an urban electorate (to elect their regional > parliament). That would produce no inequality of voting power. > When it comes to the national parliament, a suggestion is that, instead > of representation on a strict population basis, this be modified > somewhat to allow a more appropriate representation of each region. > (without going to the extreme situation we have with State Senate > representation.) Simon : > It is probably a bit hard to separate out Senate reform when you are > talking about abolishing States!! Under the current arrangements, the > Senate has members chosen from the States, voting as one electorate. David : > I think it's possible to imagine the states still being used to elect > senators, but not as sovereign administrative units. Perhaps only as an > interim measure, but I think the issues are separable. And I don't want > to pick fights I don't absolutely need to. > The counterargument is that the current system is undemocratic and > should be changed, and we shouldn't pussyfoot about. Also a reasonable > approach, and one I could live with. Pat writes: > It would appear to me that the biggest problem caused by the current > delineations of electorates is the fact that it is based on number of > voters. While well intentioned, I think it needs to be a little more > sophisticated than this, and take into account land area. David writes >>, in reply to Pat, > : >> I can't see a person who lives in the country should have a greater >> input into control of government expenditure than a person who lives in >> Sydney. I moved from Armidale to Canberra to Sydney and I don't think >> I've become less relevant to Australia's government. >> To be fair, Pat does talk below about multiple electorates and averaging >> votes. I haven't really addressed this because (1) I don't understand >> what he means and (2) I think he does want to ditch one vote one value >> in at least some circumstances, which I feel is retrograde. > If the current equal numbers per electorate/region prevails, we > are going to just be replacing one unbalanced "Golden Triangle" > system with a new one. >> What does "Golden Triangle" mean? Rule by drug lords? I'm guessing it >> means everything SE of a line between Brisbane and Adelaide, something >> like that? > if we are considering a reorganisation, and provide electorates > that encompass meaningful areas from a management point of view. >> I don't think I understand this sentence. What's a meaningless area, >> from a management point of view? Charles writes: > When it comes to the national parliament, a suggestion is that, instead > of representation on a strict population basis, this be modified > somewhat to allow a more appropriate representation of each region. DB: > You sound like someone who wants to hint at non-1V1V representation > without actually admitting to it. -- In an attempt at summary, I wrote : Max says removing the states would be the best option. Charles says that moving the government to Canberra would make it even more "remote". Lets consider "regional autonomy", "influence" and "cash flows". First, what's so wrong with Max's council staying as it is ? If they're only spending their own money, and "doing their own thing", then not a lot. One problem comes with internal/external cash flows. Are we subsidising Berrigan, or is Berrigan subsidising the state ? (You shouldn't take this too far - we're a single nation after all, with a common economy.) But, to the extent that money is flowing into a region to support the council infrastructure, then clearly the residents of a smaller council have more money per capita flowing in to support that council compared larger councils. There's a little inequity here. Nevertheless, this inequity could be justified based on the idea that there are minimal standards of geographic closeness to centres of power, and that the "country" has less access to services compared to city regions, so this is something of a compensation. We need to look at the scale of operation - not just the democracy or the population, but the manner in which services are delivered. You might then have an additional effective subsidy because things do not have the economies of scale reached by larger councils (though by not employing separate employees, small councils may do some things more efficiently). If there is an effective subsidy, it makes sense to identify - but, depending on our driving principles, it might be possible to justify such a subsidy. But, this is just the start of a broader issue - what "cash injections" is a region entitled to from common taxes, as a separate issue to what it does autonomously ? This is an issue which needs to be clarified. The next problem comes with "external influence" - how Berrigan is able to influence the operation of higher levels of government. If each council region has elected a member to (say) the second house of a national parliament, then individuals within smaller council regions will have more influence on matters of government through their representative. Things deviate from 1V-1V. This is a more thorny issue. One possibility is that several adjacent council regions elect their representative, meaning the "population" encompassed by a single representative is more even. Or, we can just accept the 1V-1V deviation, because our driving principles mean we can accept _some_ deviation in pursuit of regional autonomy. Next, consider the "distance" of government, a concern of Charles, one which he considers as a motivation for regions with "state-like" powers. Sure, people feel distant from government. But its not clear that putting in closer levels of government is the only way of fixing this concern. If we were to have a single national government, and local governments, the relative simplicity of the system would mean people could take more of an interest in national goverment - there are no longer multiple layers confusing the issue. But, in addition, it makes sense for further reforms to be made to the national government - perhaps a second house which is drawn from councillors in the local governments - in order to prevent the national government from becoming too distant. Lastly, I think that Berrigan is that small that the State Government grants it autonomy and doesn't much meddle in its affairs. This compares with city councils, where, through the land and environment court and other means, council decisions are overturned. This is a difficult issue. There's population pressure in Sydney, and a desire to build high density development to serve the growing population, with councils wanting to prevent the construction of buildings. "Coping with population and urban pressures" is a larger region concern, while a council thinks in terms of its own narrow view of amenity. So, there's going to be tension, even before you think in terms of conspiracy theories involving "big nasty developers" having "undue influence" on state government.