These are a family of approaches involving direct election of people
to boards looking after health, law and order, whatever. They have
mostly been suggested by David and Pat from what I recall.

I've introduced my own model in contrast to David's model, I have not
given it a separate section.

David introduces the approach :

> One model for a future Australian government is to have the National
> government mediate administration through functional bodies ("The
> Murray-Darling Basin Agency", "The Northwest Victorian Health Board",
> "Newcastle Police Administration Area").

> A criticism of this is that it weakens democratic accountability.  The
> people served by the NWVHB are the people of northwestern Victoria, but
> if they are dissatisfied with its performance they can only try to
> change things by changing their vote in the national parliament.  This
> isn't really a good method because it affects too many other things.
> Would I be right to say this is in principle an issue with responsible
> government, but this particular structure exacerbates the problem?

> An obvious solution: have the people directly elect the functional
> bodies.  This is analogous to the US approach, where they directly elect
> fire chiefs, police chiefs, judges, etc..  But it's happening on a
> larger scale.

> Should the functional bodies be under the control of the national
> government?  Some would say no, they should have guaranteed boundaries
> and budgets in the constitution.  I'd say yes, because changing the
> constitution is (intentionally) hard.  There are compromises here (2/3
> vote of parliament).  But there will be a tension between responsibility
> to a higher level and independence.

> Also, who should be elected?  Just the head of the organisation?  The
> head of the MDBA would be a sort of quasi-minister with responsibility
> for the Murray-Darling Basin.  I kind of like the idea of such a person
> being directly elected, but I could get very irritated with filling in
> enormous numbers of ballot sheets.  How many people should anyone be
> asked to elect?  Should we be able to pass our proxies to some other
> level of government (e.g.  the national parliament), so effectively
> allowing us to choose between the current system and direct election?
> Would this lead to any different result than people ticking the party
> out of ignorance of the candidate?

Mark writes :

> Functional bodies SHOULD be under the ultimate control of the national
> government - certainly in all three functional areas you mention - the
> Murray Darling, Health and Policing.  Laws and overarching regulations,
> standards and policies would be set by the national government.
> Regional bodies could have significant autonomy so long as they satisfy
> or exceed minimum laws, standards and requirements generally.

> Regional bodies should have implementation roles rather than a law,
> regulation and policy setting ones.  This doesn't mean that regional
> bodies are powerless, or that all regions will be equally well served;
> what it does mean is that they can focus on achieving outcomes rather
> than be bogged down by the burden of broad law and policy making
> responsibilities.

> One way of linking functionality with democratic accountability under
> such a model would be to make national government electorates (and on
> this, I'd like to see these electorates host at least 5 members ideally
> at least 7 - each to facilitate sufficient democratic justice through
> proportional representation) more or less conform with the boundaries of
> such regional bodies. 

> There could be just 30 federal electorates, each providing say 5 to 9
> members to a single chamber 210 or so member parliament (noting that we
> have 226 or so now between the House of Reps and the Senate).  These 30
> regions could be designed, as far as is possible, to accommodate one or
> more functional regions.  They could, for example, coincide exactly with
> regional policing and County/Supreme court systems (explorations of a
> new court system provide good insights here ...).  They may be such that
> there are 60 (say) health regions such that some electorates host one
> health region whereas others will host two or more, and some may amount
> to just one-half or so of a health region.

> If functional regions are established according to functional
> imperatives, then it would be difficult to obtain watertight matches
> between functional regions and regional electorates, but sometimes this
> is considered better - between electorates and functional boundaries can
> demand/enhance cross-boundary cooperation and cohesion (the classic
> illustration of this is in Switzerland, where cantonal boundaries
> [cantons are like our states] do not coincide with settlement patterns
> based on language and religion - this lack of coincidence means that
> cultural bridges form across cantonal boundaries ...).

> I'd be open to health boards being democratically elected, albeit to
> positions with powers associated with implementation (these would be
> like those held by people on school Parents and Citizens/Friends boards)
> but I'm not sure that elected regional police boards are apt - given the
> opportunity for corruption, to me some things like this need to be above
> politics and above localised democracy (with respect to smaller
> localities).  Different functional imperatives might call for differing
> levels of democratic features, accountability mechanisms, checks and
> balances etc.

> I say all the above in support of national control of certain regional
> functional bodies whilst also strongly supporting the idea that some
> significant powers, responsibilities and rights should be
> constitutionally assigned to local/regional communities/governments to
> help facilitate close to the people democracy, accountability and
> functional effectiveness in terms of outcomes achieved.  In my view such
> powers and responsibilities would include those assigned now to local
> governments (notwithstanding modest variation across the states) plus
> some GENERAL community/regional development roles with industry,
> employment and welfare elements - I emphasise the GENERALITY here to
> emphasise the significant autonomy that such generality could provide.
> I also maintain that all communities/localities are entitled to
> equitable shares of government grants that they after all have
> contributed toward - in other words a Grants Commission type grants
> allocation system but applied to entities somewhat (possibly much)
> smaller than present mainland states.

Max writes :

> The type of bodies that has been suggested are already in place, there
> is a body that oversees the Murray Darling Basin, but this body has the
> problem that it has four states and the federal government to answer to
> so very little gets done.  These boards have some representatives put up
> by local communities but still has to many people put there by the state
> governments.

David write further :

> I think the key issue is: is it necessary to have a government tier
> between the national and the local?  Or is it better to fill in this gap
> with functionally oriented bureaucracy?

> By functional, I mean bodies oriented toward a single function, e.g.  a
> health administration area, or a Murray-Darling basin authority.  As
> distinct from governments, which have all the functions tied together
> into a single body.  The functional approach is better for getting the
> boundaries where you want them (e.g.  water admin areas along catchment
> lines) the government approach is better for minimising demarcation
> disputes between bureaucracies (e.g.  is algal bloom a water issue or a
> health issue?).

> I currently incline toward city-level governments for, say, Townsville
> and up, and a functional approach in the country.  But there's some
> disagreement there and I'll freely admit that my take on it is based on
> a gut feeling of which potential problem is more severe in each regime,
> no analysis.

> And, OK, there are probably other key issues.  For instance, some would
> be concerned about power becoming too centralised.  One argument I use
> here is that I assume by the time states are abolished the baseline
> government will be a republic and the elected president will have some
> authority.  So that's the new source of inertia.

I wrote :

> If people have a problem with their local administrative area, they
> could lobby for change through their local member.

> In fact, that's the idea at present.  The problem with the present
> system is that there's an overlap between policy direction and
> representation if you have a problem, and party politics causes its
> problems.

> This might be addressed by having an upper house of "ombudsmen".
> Nominally, these ombudsmen would be apolitical, but you'd have five or
> six per

> The ombudsmen would have limited power to stop things, but a capacity to
> review and publicise problems.  Their function would be not to develop
> policy, but to review its implementation.

> Their function would be much more individual operation rather than
> meeting in parliament, but there would be powers which the house could
> do through a 90% vote, presumably in cases of an extreme abuse of power
> or corruption.

> You can have political games to reach 51% of the vote, but when you are
> talking 90% that's not political games - that's consensus.

> This house would provide an outlet for people dissatisfied with the
> performance of a regional authority without the need to change a given
> vote in national parliament.

> Problems can be divided into two varieties : policy and implementation.
> Are the standards, priorities and budgets set by the national government
> appropriate ?  "Normal" democratic processes have most influence here,
> though the ombudmen's house could comment on emerging policy.  Then you
> have implementation.  That's where the review of these bodies via the
> ombudsmen's house is most strongest, and represents the best democratic
> trade-off.

> A fundamental problem here is that you need a body with the scale
> appropriate to the problem.  Health in one region does not really impact
> on health in an adjoining region.  However, the use of a river in one
> region does impact on its use in another.  Therefore, bodies like the
> Murray-Darling authority need teeth.

> In a sense, there is too much democracy in the Murray-Darling situation,
> in that it encourages and entrenches powerful vested interests which
> cannot develop a good solution to to the problem.  Often, "regional"
> government is useful, but it can cause problems.  This would be an
> exception.

> Electorates of the ombudmen's house should coincide with the functional
> regions, and streamline the functional regions as a matter of overall
> policy.

> An enhancement would be to have elected advisory groups to the different
> regional bodies.  While just advisory, they could appeal to the
> ombudsmen if the regional body is totally ignoring them and going off
> course.

> Advisory/scrutinising police boards, with other levels of scrutiny,
> might fit well into this overall scheme.

> Advisory groups to help provide extra democratic input appeal to me.  A
> lot of this goes on at present.  However, a cynical side of me wonders
> if government bodies consult and then do what they were going to do
> anyway.  Does this happen ?  How would we know ?  How would we prevent
> it ?  I don't know.

Pat writes :

> I remember one of the original seminars that I went to, where we talked
> about regions that identify with local resources.  If we are going to
> change our forms of governance, I wonder whether or not we can't explore
> more diverse forms of governance.  i.e., a catchment council/region, a
> general overall management council/region, a local traffic
> council/region, a local primary producers council/region.  Would it be
> possible for all these different councils/regions to have different
> boundaries that make sense to their focus?  How would you elect
> representatives for these different councils?  I think these groups
> would be answerable and administered by a specific federal government
> department?

AJ writes :

> Further to your question, Pat, about a more sophisticated system of
> specific-purpose regions: yes, I fully agree that the current system is
> full of baggage which can hinder as well as illuminate!  Mark gave some
> examples of where better specific-purpose regionalisation could work,
> the huge example he didn't mention is School Districts in the US - there
> has recently been substantial amalgamation and downsizing in US School
> Districts but they remain effectively a massive local/political
> structure in their own right, with locally elected district boards, in
> parallel to other 'general purpose' local government.

> Phillip Toyne and many others believe the plethora of regional
> environmental and natural resource mgt programs in Australia are also
> likely to keep consolidating into a serious regional infrastructure
> irrespective of 'political'(i.e.  constitutional) structures (a la
> Murray-Darling congress).

> So I tend to agree with you, one of the keys to WHY all this has real
> social and economic potential (apart from simple efficiency and
> transparency) is the opportunities for building new social capital,
> making better use of social capital that exists and bringing about
> better political decentralisation back to a community level.  That
> doesn't mean creating more politicians in the sense of full-time elected
> officials (a la John's suggestion) but it does mean creating more
> politicians in terms of reinvigorating the extent to which people marry
> positive civic action and publicly-recognised community service roles
> and responsibilities into their everyday lives.  (Here we get into
> Robert Putnam's American social capital stuff).

> MAX - you asked about examples of where amalgamation has worked.  How
> much do you know about the Tasmanian amalg program?  It seems to have
> gone much better than Victoria's, specifically because although it was
> forced on councils by a decision of state govt HOW it was done was left
> to the councils, which took care to set up a transition program which
> kept as much of the existing 'social capital' (that word again) as
> possible.  Some local govt types in NSW have told me the same approach
> is needed in NSW (NSW North Coast is the region) because voluntary amalg
> isn't achieving anything.  Of course, that's assuming amalgamation can
> have ANY benefits - I'm not an expert on whether the promised efficiency
> gains have materialised in Victoria or elsewhere, probably some have but
> never to the extent promised by economic rationalists (while there have
> been other social costs).  That's the general experience with
> corporatisation and privatisation policies - specific reforms CAN
> produce real benefits but not if pursued with the sweeping 'Mein
> Kampf'-style ideology that dominated the 90s (we have done some
> Queensland Treasury-supported research in this area).

I wrote (in reply to Pat)

> One problem with this model is its complexity.

> Now, it depends on how much "latent participative interest" is out
> there.  You can assume that streamlining government into national and
> local simplifies things to the point where government is easier to
> relate to, and there would then be a renewal of interest in government
> and democracy.

> So, I'm talking about making the government easier to relate to.

> For your approach to work, we need to assume a greater amount of latent
> interest.  Maybe that's reasonable, but it is a definite assumption in
> your approach.

> Further, on your other email you talk about separate republics at the
> different levels ...  would this really improve that ?

Pat replies :

> I just found it an interesting idea.  I know that it is complex at the
> outset.  I suppose it just depends on how you box it.  Maybe regions
> under this context goes under portfolio's, and avoids separate regions
> with all the bits assigned to a fixed area of land, whether they are
> relevant to the area or not.

> An advantage I can see to this model is the more logical assignment of
> resources, funding, and clearer decision making processes that should be
> able to make more effective, holistic decisions that will get results.

Mark writes :

> I'd like to support Pat's suggestions regarding more diverse forms of
> governance tailored to diverse settlement patterns and varying
> functional imperatives.  Most big American metropolises (or
> megalopolises) do NOT have large metropolitan governments like Brisbane
> Council, but they do have SOME authority (or authorities) which
> operate(s) at the whole of metropolis level - especially for areas such
> as water/resource management, urban planning, transport etc.

> In previous discussions, Max and I felt that significant urban and
> transport planning and water/resource management roles would be apt for
> such an authority, which could be termed (say) a "special purpose
> metropolitan government/authority", leaving to local councils within the
> metropolis the fuller, more GENERAL array of municipal functions, powers
> and responsibilities.

> An alternative to the above would be "secondary representation" in which
> councils in Sydney could upwardly appoint/delegate to a whole of Sydney
> authority.  Ted Mack in a recent phone chat expressed his view that such
> indirect/secondary representation was problematic and inferior to direct
> representation - Ted's position seems to make clear sense in respect of
> keeping democratic and accountability chains nice and direct and clear,
> and I fully support it.

> The urban, transport and water/resource planning responsibilities
> suggested here ought to be national government responsibilities, so that
> the Sydney authority would be limited by national laws, regulations and
> standards (for example safety standards, pollution emission standards
> etc.)

> Such planning should be carried out in regions sized aptly given
> functional imperatives.  For most matters of urban, transport and
> water/resource planning, the whole of Sydney would seem the only apt
> scale, though of course there would be coordination with and in practice
> power and responsibility sharing with localities/councils within Sydney,
> but this would be much more seamless than at present if based upon
> consistent national planning laws, regulations and standards.

> In non-urban areas where urban planning is not needed, but transport and
> water/resource management is still vital, councils would probably be
> best/well placed to take on such town planning/management roles as they
> already do, without the need for separate "special purpose" planning and
> resource management bodies.  We could expect such roles to be carried
> out better than at present if based upon consistent national planning
> laws, regulations and standards.